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ABSTRACT

Consider the tragic case of four circus clowns whose pie-to-the-face gag effectively
knocks each one into a cream-pie coma. In each of the four cases, motor capacities (voluntary
speech, limb movement, etc.) are not available to the patient’s conscious control. Although none
of our apparently comatose clowns have voluntary motor capacities, each has a unique set of
internal and external activity going on. In other words, each of our clowns (Bozo, Chuckles,
Wiggles, and Krusty, respectively), now sits in a Vegetative State. Now, there’s a problem.
Sometimes comatose patients are conscious, so there’s a big philosophical and empirical issue
going on here: how can we tell which patients are conscious and which ones aren’t? Different
neuroscientists and philosophers use the concept ‘consciousness’ in a variety of ways and have
proposed different tests based on what they take ‘consciousness’ to stand for. To solve this
problem, we’ll need to figure out the best conception of ‘consciousness’ and the test it
corresponds to. To figure out if there's a way to free conscious patients from their confounding
bodies, I will: (1) examine four promising proposals in the scientific and philosophical literature
about the conditions under which patients have vegetative consciousness and how to test for it;
and (2) consider whether the proposed tests are efficient or accurate measures of detecting the
kind of consciousness they are trying to test for. Based on how (1) and (2) turn out, I’m going to
argue that one of the four theories—the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness (or
IITC)—gives both the best account of consciousness and the most reliable test for it, and
therefore offers the most promise for detecting consciousness in VS patients.
ii
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CONSCIOUSNESS IN COMATOSE CLOWNS: NO FUNNY BUSINESS
1. INTRODUCTION

Consider the tragic case of four circus clowns whose pie-to-the-face gag effectively
knocks each one into a cream-pie coma. In each of the four cases, motor capacities (voluntary
speech, limb movement, etc.) are no longer available to the patient’s conscious control. In other
words, each of our clowns (Bozo, Chuckles, Wiggles, and Krusty, respectively), now sits in a
Vegetative State (VS for short). On the other hand, although none of our apparently comatose
clowns have voluntary motor capacities, each has a unique set of internal and external activity
going on. Now, we have a problem. Sometimes comatose patients are conscious, so there’s a
big philosophical and empirical issue that demands attention: how can we tell which patients are
conscious and which ones aren’t? Different neuroscientists and philosophers use the concept
‘consciousness’ in a variety of ways and have proposed different tests based on what they take
‘consciousness’ to stand for. To solve this problem, we’ll need to figure out the best conception
of ‘consciousness’ and the test it corresponds to. So, why exactly should we care about all this
consciousness stuff? For a few reasons: First, we don’t want to give false hope (to loved ones
and researchers alike). Second, we don’t want to waste limited resources (money, hospital space,
staff time, etc.). Third, while we do want to avoid the first issue, we don’t want to do it by
unplugging the conscious patients—we want to un-trap them. To figure out if there's a way to
free conscious patients from their confounding bodies, I will:
1

(1) examine four promising proposals in the scientific and philosophical literature about the
conditions under which patients have vegetative consciousness ; (2) consider how to test for
consciousness as described in each case; and (3) consider whether the proposed tests are proper
or accurate measures for detecting each type of consciousness.
Based on how (1)-(3) turn out, I will argue that one of the four theories—the Integrated
Information Theory of Consciousness (or IITC)—gives both the best account of consciousness
and the most reliable test for it, and therefore offers the most promise for detecting
consciousness in VS patients.

2

2. SEND IN THE CLOWNS
Back at the hospital, the primary care physician Dr. John Dolittle has tried out some tests on our
clowns in an attempt to figure out which ones are conscious. In spite of Dolittle’s best efforts, the
test results look both peculiar and inconclusive. Puzzled, he shares his report with the head of the
coma ward, Dr. Abby Normal, in the hopes of getting a second opinion on the matter. Here’s
what Dolittle reports to Dr. Normal:
2.1 The Reports
Name: Clown, Bozo T.
Symptoms: fMRI scan showed activity in the spatial and motor cortexes of Bozo’s brain which
fired after a verbal statement was uttered.
Test and Results: Patient was asked to imagine standing still in a tennis court and swinging his
arm to hit the ball. This command was followed by activity in the brain regions involved in
motor imagery (in the pre-frontal cortex). Patient was next told to imagine walking from room to
room in his home and visualizing what he would see there. Immediately afterward, the
parahippocampal gyrus (associated with navigation and spatial imagery) was activated.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Name: Clown, Chuckles T.
Symptoms: The fMRI scan showed activity in Chuckles’ parietal lobe. The parietal lobe is
3

related to temperature-tactile stimuli, activated when a patient ‘feels’ cold, hot, etc.. The parietal
lobe is activated after the glass cube in the patient’s hand when you tell Chuckles that the
(lukewarm) glass cube in his hand is an ice cube.
Test and Results: A glass cube and verbal stimulus (‘the instructor will put an ice-cube in your
hand’) was administered to him. Parietal lobe of Chuckles the clown is triggered after both the
glass cube and verbal stimulus (‘the instructor will put an ice-cube in your hand’) are
administered to him.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Name: Clown, Wiggles T.
Symptoms: Wiggles did not show activation in the spatial or motor cortices even after testing.
Instead, Wiggles possessed motion-processing and color-processing capacities which activated at
different times in different sensory-specific cortices.
Test and Results: A red patch was held in front of Wiggles’ eyes. At this time, regions V4 and
V4a of the brain (affiliated with color processing) were activated. Next, a red ball was moved
back and forth in front of the patient’s eyes. Immediately afterwards, the V5 region of the brain
(involved in motion processing) was activated roughly 100ms before V4-V4a (color processing).
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Name: Clown, Krusty T.
Symptoms: Krusty’s neural systems display high levels of activity and interaction between
highly-specialized regions of the thalamocortical system. The thalamocortical system has a
couple things going on. First, it has highly-specialized structures built up to fulfill very particular
4

kinds of functions. Second, it has ways of connecting (or integrating) all these highly-specialized
systems. So, we have both highly-specialized (custom-made) functional systems and high levels
of connection between these specialized systems going on (Tononi 293-294).
Test: A plastic-encased electromagnetic wire coil was released onto Krusty's scalp, generating
an electric current in the patient's gray matter right under the skull. The current then activated
brain cells, fiber passageways, and synaptically-linked neurons. The EEG and MRI scans
displayed lots of activity in Krusty's thalamocortical system—many regions lit up on the MRI,
including sites with task-specific regions (color and motion detection, etc.) and others affiliated
with a whole slew of other tasks and capacities of various kinds. The EEG scan (a measuring
stick for the amplitude of the electrical activity in the brain) showed high amplitudes of electrical
activity (ringing at roughly 30 to 35 times a second).
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------After looking over the patient charts, Dr. Normal doesn't know what to conclude. So, she decides
to take a look at some of the basic literature in consciousness studies. What she discovers is that
people are defining consciousness in all sorts of ways. The following are the definitions Dr.
Normal came across:
2.2 Concepts of Consciousness
Object-consciousness versus fact-consciousness
The doctor finds that some philosophers (like Fred Dretske) draw a distinction between object
consciousness and fact-consciousness. In object-consciousness (or knowledge of things), the
perceiver is just aware of the object of experience. (In certain cases, this object can be the
experience itself.) In other words, the perceiver does not take the object of experience to be some
5

way or to have some set of attributes—the stimuli is ‘felt’ but no perspective is taken. On the
other hand, fact-consciousness, (or knowledge of truths) is being aware that something is the
case—in other words, the perceiver perceives the object as being some way.1 The object is had
from a certain perspective—the perceiver’s take is a part of the experience (Dretske 263-4).
Brute-consciousness versus reflective-consciousness:
As Dr. Normal read on, she finds that some philosophers make distinctions between kinds of
reflective and fact-consciousness: brute-consciousness and reflective-consciousness (Gallagher
and Zahavi 119-21). In brute-consciousness, the perceiver is aware of the experience but forms
no concepts about the experience. Think of the earthworm’s pain when it’s lopped in half by the
fiendish fisherman—even though the earthworm may not be capable of forming concepts about
the pain, it is certainly pained by the decapitation—it can feel the pain even if it can’t say
anything about the pain it’s undergoing. Unlike the earthworm’s pain, reflective-consciousness
pain demands that the experiencer have some first-person, reflective concept in mind while they
undergo the experience—so, if the fiendish fisherman gets whacked in the face by the angered
earthworm, the fisherman will both have an awareness of the slimy slap and be aware that he’s
aware of the counterattack. Some philosophers think you can make judgments without reflective
consciousness. By this assumption, reflective-consciousness is a kind of fact-consciousness and
object consciousness is something a brute thing like the earthworm could have. It follows that
fact-consciousness requires some kind of judgment, maybe even reflective-awareness.
Self-awareness versus first-person awareness

1

This point about consciousness as consciousness of can be traced back to Brentano’s descriptive psychology project
in the early 19th century.
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Our doctor gets to self-awareness and first-person awareness. According to her reading of
Chalmers, something can be self-aware so long as it’s something like a system capable of
scanning itself for viruses (Chalmers 221-4). On the other hand, first-person awareness is an
awareness of who one is and where one is. In other words, the subject self attributes the
experience, which requires internal introspection.
In an attempt to see where and how these two concepts connect and where they come apart,
the doctor thinks up another example. Think of alien limb syndrome. The patient, first-personally
aware of the limb’s movements, experiences the limb and its actions but does not associate those
actions/consider those to belong to him/her—there’s no self-awareness—they’re just along for
the ride. This, to our doctor, suggests that first-person experience does not guarantee selfawareness. Particularly in VS cases, thinks Dr. Normal, this problem will become even trickier to
resolve.
Access-consciousness versus phenomenal-consciousness
Having found no clear answer, our doctor continues to sift until she comes across an article by
Ned Block. She takes Block to say that access-consciousness occurs when information is made
available to the executive control (or ‘scanning’) centers of a system (Block 272-3). Essentially,
something is access-conscious if there’s the right kind of broadcasting between frontal areas of
the brain and other, task-specific regions (Crick and Koch 570). When phenomenalconsciousness is present, the patient can sometimes just have a ‘felt’ dimension to his states—no
complex thoughts are even present, in some cases.
When phenomenal-consciousness is present, the patient can sometimes just have a ‘felt’
dimension to his states—no complex thoughts are even present, in some cases. Dr. Normal
7

discovers that the relationship between access-consciousness and phenomenal-consciousness is
controversial. For some, phenomenal-consciousness can be identified with brain structure and
function. For others, phenomenal-consciousness is something that goes on in addition to (but
systematically correlated with) structure and function. These issues are pretty confusing to Dr.
Normal, so she sets this pair aside. After all, she is dealing with human patients in the actual
world.
*************
Now Dr. Normal is even more confused than she was before consulting the literature. She
accosts her reading materials:
“Alright, you’ve got some nifty-sounding ideas, but how do we know that any of these concepts
are accompanied by conscious experience?! And which of our clowns is really conscious?!”
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3. THEORIST THROWDOWN
Having heard Dr. Normal’s screams of frustration from down the hall, consciousness experts Dr.
Adrian Owen, Semir Zeki, Giulio Tononi, and Christof Koch cram into Dr. Normal’s doorway,
each theorist yelling over the others in an effort to get his own idea heard. As the jabbering
reaches a dull roar, Dr. Normal replies.
“Quiet, all of you!” Booms Dr. Normal. “Now, I’d be happy to hear all of your suggestions one
at a time. You there—Dr. Owen—start us off.”
3. 1. Owen
3.1.1 What consciousness is
Dr. Owen explains that he (now) thinks of consciousness as a sort of brute object-awareness plus
self-awareness and reflective first-person awareness of who and where you are (Martin,
Vanhaudenhuyse, Coleman, Boly, Pickard, Tshibanda, Owen, and Laurys 1936-8). So,
consciousness, according to Owen, entails a complex kind of awareness where the patient
possesses both object-consciousness (knowledge by direct acquaintance that something is going
on) and fact-consciousness (knowledge about the experience). Put another way, consciousness,
by Owen’s definition, is knowing who you are, where you are, and what is going on around you.
He doesn’t really address what his take on phenomenal and access-consciousness is.2

2

Although Owen doesn’t mention it, it’s clear that some form of access-consciousness is going on here.
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3.1.2 How to find it
How do you catch the conscious person? According to Dr. Owen, you need to find out if the
patient’s spatial and motor cortices can be activated. If so, try to use those areas to get the patient
to communicate. If this awareness response is present, reproduce this response in a way that will
allow the patient to communicate yes/no answers by letting them manipulate their own brain
activity in the spatial and motor cortexes, a method that would not require the use of motorresponse training. This method is called the volitional test. We already have a couple clowns
who have this kind of activity going on in their brain regions (Bozo and Krusty)—all we have to
do now is train the patients to use these areas to talk to us. Here are the specifics of Owen’s
volitional test:
In order to get a yes/no response pattern, brain areas involved in motor and spatial
awareness must be activated according to the yes/no answer each area’s activation indicates as a
form of command following. The activation of areas involved in motor imagery was used to
indicate ‘yes’ answers. In order for the patient to answer ‘yes’, he/she must be told to imagine
standing still in a tennis court and swinging his/her arm to hit the ball. In order to activate the
areas in charge of spatial imagery to indicate a ‘no’ answer, the patient must be told to imagine
walking down a familiar street or walking from room to room in his/her home and visualizing
what he/she would ‘see’ (1930-3).3
3.1.3 What this means and why it works
If the VS patient does use this yes/no system, then we know they’re capable of willfully

3

This test is something like the Turing test (Turing 433-60), with the exception of the qualities behind the output.
While Turing suggested that we get mechanistic imitation of conscious activity from the machines, Owen’ Turinglike test assumes the binary ‘yes’/’no’ answer indicates not just behavioral imitation but conscious communication.
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controlling their own brain activity, suggesting that VS patient is conscious (and capable of
conscious communication) even in the absence of other motor functions. Based on what regions
of the brain we’d need to activate, it’s obvious, concludes Owen, that three of our four clowns —
Bozo, Chuckles, and Krusty-- are likely conscious, but to know for certain, we’d have to make
sure that this activity could be repeated on command. Sadly, Wiggles’ conscious state is
indeterminate at best.
Owen goes on to explain the test’s assets in greater detail. Based on this test, not only do
the VS patients have the capacity to think a given thought (tennis or home)—they can use this
thought to say something else over and above the raw experience to say something about that
experience (Owen 132-4). So, the VS patient is not just capable of having certain thoughts, but
inducing and deploying them intentionally in order to communicate. Even when behavioral tests
of awareness fail, we can test for internal awareness by allowing the patient to use their
spatial/motor imagery capacities to communicate.
“That’s all well and good, but you’ve missed the most important part,” Dr Noh chimes in.
3.1.4 Some methodological setbacks
According to Dr. Noh’s criticism, areas of the brain associated with awareness can be activated
right after verbal commands were presented to the patient. However, these areas can also be
triggered in the absence of a command as a result of apparently involuntary reflex. By focusing
on the brain chunk being activated instead of what is activating that brain chunk, it’s unclear
whether the activated brain area is the result of the intentional action of the patient’s conscious
effort or just the product of an automatic, bodily reflex. (Even Owen admits that there are still
errors in taking certain kinds of firing as intentional awareness when it could be just sporadic,
11

reflexive firing (Owen, 2006).)
Noh is willing to grant that the causal relation in Owen’s volitional test is necessary, but
he doesn’t think it’s a sufficient determinant of conscious experience. If power of
misrepresentation is present, the patient’s thoughts will have aboutness, so the thoughts will be
directed at the object of the patient’s experience. Owen’s test is aimed at testing for intentionality
(since he’s trying to test for the patient’s ability to mentally represent the object of his experience
as being some way), but his test fails to meet the criteria you’d need to prove that this kind of
intentional awareness is present. So, while strongly suggestive of intentional production of motor
or spatial imagery, we need a better way to substantiate Owen’s test.
“Oh yeah?” Owen sputters, “Let’s see you come up with a better solution!”
“Hold your horses, we’ll get there!” Exclaims Noh. “First, let me just explain what kind of
consciousness I’m looking for—you know, the right kind of consciousness.”
3.2 Noh
3.2.1 What consciousness is
Essentially, the patient’s consciousness is made up of 1) the awareness of the stimuli; and 2) the
attribution of traits to this object of awareness (Noh 4-8). Noh believes that the patient's’ ability
to mentally represent stimuli as having certain properties reveals the intensionality below the
intentionality of the representation. Intensionality captures the way that a representation
designates its objects. Different representations can label the same object in different ways. So,
one representation can’t always be substituted for the other in all circumstances (in thought or
talk). Noh then makes an example of Chuckles. According to Noh, Chuckles not only
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experiences the ice cube, but has certain particular kinds of (intensional) feelings (that the icecube is cold) which belong to the (intentional) beliefs about this experience (where the patient
believes the ice-cube is in his own hand). If the patient’s experience possesses these two
attributes, then the patient is able to get into his multi-faceted mental representation (8-9).
3.2.2 How to find it
Noh explains that to overcome the issues which the volitional test encounters, he’s concocted the
misrepresentation test, which focuses on an area whose reflexive triggers cannot (as the motor
cortex’s activations is) be mistaken for state-conscious representational states: the parietal lobe.
Here’s what you’ll need to do:
To test for this misrepresentation we can use fMRI or EEG to detect temperature-tactile
activation by detecting activity in the parietal lobe. Put a lukewarm glass cube in our clown
patient’s hand. Then, tell the patient that the cube in his hand is an ice-cube. If the fMRI scan
shows that the parietal lobe is activating, we know that the patient ‘feels’ cold (even though the
cube in his hand is actually lukewarm). If the patient’s parietal lobe activated after the cube and
verbal message were given, then the patient is not giving an automatic bodily response (since the
automatic bodily response should reflect a reaction to the lukewarm cube), where no activation
of the parietal lobe would occur. Instead, if the parietal lobe is activated, then the patient is
listening to the verbal message and telling its body to respond accordingly (as if the cube were a
cold ice-cube).
That’s all for the methods part, but, according to Noh, it’s got big implications.
3.2.3 What this means and how it works
If the clown’s parietal lobe is stimulated, this tells us that he is misrepresenting the physical
13

input-stimulus (by representing the warmer glass cube as being a cold ice-cube), then we know
that the patient understood the verbal instruction.4 Since the verbal instruction differs from the
physical stimulus and the body responds according to the verbal instruction rather than the
physical stimulus, we can infer that the patient misrepresents the stimulus because they
understand the verbal command and cause the body to follow suit, indicating consciousness.
“Fine, but why is this any better than my volitional test?” Owen implores.
Noh responds with an exploration of the broader implications of the misrepresentation
test. By testing for misrepresentation, we’ve detected what John Searle calls an aspectual shape5
(or how something is experienced) occurring in the patient. When the patient misrepresents, he
has some belief about the stimulus he is aware of and that belief contains a certain set of traits,
both of which allow our patient to construct some aspectual shape, intentionally-directed at the
stimulus. Based on this criteria, Noh says Chuckles and (maybe) Krusty are conscious. So long
as our clowns have the right kind of representation, they’re conscious. According to Noh, the
misrepresentation test gets around the issues of misattributing consciousness to unconscious,
reflexive states. When the patient misrepresents, he has some belief about the stimulus he’s
aware of, and that belief contains a certain set of traits, both of which allow our patient to
construct some aspectual shape intentionally-directed at the stimulus. Because no motor-sensory
areas are involved in the misrepresentation test, testing for activity in the parietal lobe prevents

4

Noh, Hyungrae. "Ascribing Consciousness to Vegetative State Patients: A New Methodology."
(n.d.): 1-14. Print.

5

Close to Gottlob Frege’s mode of presentation concept, where the nature of the reference itself does not change but
the way we take it to be does change. For example, a musical note can have different labels (or ‘senses’)--A flat and
G sharp. Here, we perceive one note in two different ways, but the note (or ‘reference’) itself doesn’t change.
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us from getting an automated-semantic response (Noh 11).
Owen is flabbergasted, “Zeki, Noh is crazy, right? Help me out here, pal.”
Zeki pipes in. “ Sorry, Owen, I’m siding with Dr. Noh on this one—you’re asking way too much
of our poor patients! Let’s lay off the requirements a little”
“See?!” smirks Dr. Noh, “Dr. Zeki is exactly right, which means my theory works better than
yours.”
Dr. Zeki throws Noh a puzzled look: “You’re half right, Dr. Noh, but your theory isn’t out of the
woods just yet either.”
Dr. Normal nods furiously. “Agreed, Zeki! But before you start your spiel, let me just get my
worry in edgewise, here.”
3.2.4.2 Some methodological setbacks
Dr. Normal explains that, even if typical cases of VS patients manage to misrepresent, there are
cases of hallucination blindsight cases where this same kind of misrepresentation occurs
unconsciously. In Paul Azzopardi and Howard Hock’s study, visual hallucination in blindsight
cases were explored to see whether these illusions could be processed without the conscious
participation of the patient. According to the results, the patient reports that they aren’t aware of
the visual stimulus going on in their impaired lobe. The problem is, in spite of this, the motion’s
direction was processed ‘correctly’ in the visual field, so the ‘motion’ within the illusion was
detected by the impaired lobe, in spite of the patient’s lack of awareness (Azzopardi and Hock
877-8). Discrimination (through a kind of mis-representation) occurs, but without the input of the
patient’s conscious awareness (878). Here, the ‘right’ answer is given, but not as the result of
15

something brought to the attention of the patient’s conscious awareness. So, just because the
cases of misrepresentation happen to be conscious doesn’t mean that it’s the mis-representation
that makes them conscious, since this activity can be performed even in the absence of
consciousness.
“Your turn. Zeki.”
The big worry Zeki has with the theories of both Noh and Owen has to do with sticking
the ‘consciousness’ label on post-conscious activity. Zeki points out that sensory-specific
detection processes (like color and motion) happen at different times. He argues that there is
evidence that consciousness can happen even at the level of space-and-time-separated color and
motion processing and that the unity of experiences is a post-conscious phenomenon. In cases
where patients are presented with motion and color stimuli, motion is processed before color by
roughly 100ms although the patient mistakenly assumes that the two (motion detection and color
detection) occur in the same instance (Moutoussis and Zeki 1409-11). In fact, he argues, there is
evidence of mis-binding.
According to the Moutoussis-Zeki study, patients mis-bind motion detection to colordetection. Here, the patient scoots the motion-processing later so that it and the color-process
allegedly occur simultaneously (even though motion processing occurs approximately 100ms
before color-processing) (1409-10). In a series of trials, patients were presented with a series of
images (of changing color and direction) and were told to determine which change happened first
and whether the change was simultaneous. The patients claimed that the motion and color
changes happened simultaneously. However, the test results show that the patient’s brain regions
responsible for motion activated before the region responsible for color detection. Since the brain
16

only binds these experiences once each site has processed its respective data and brought the data
to a perceptual level, it seems that this unification (of visual and motion processing) occurs only
after the perceptual experience has occurred in the respective sites. So, unified experiences are
really just post-conscious phenomena (Zeki 584-5).
Both Owen and Noh toss Zeki a skeptical glare. “And just what would you propose we do
instead, Dr. Zeki?” the theorists demand.
“First, you both need to adjust your take on consciousness,” Zeki replies. “I’ll describe my
version of consciousness then get into the plan of action we ought to take—to save all the
conscious clowns you guys keep trying to kill off!”
3.3 Zeki
3.3.1 What consciousness is
Zeki asserts that we need to draw a distinction between micro-consciousness and macroconsciousness. According to Zeki, micro-consciousness is 1) distributed across space in sensoryspecific regions, and 2) distributed across time based on when these regions are activated. For
instance, since color processing occurs in region V4 and motion processing occurs in the
geographically-distinct V5 region and each process is its own micro-consciousness, microconsciousnesses are distributed across space. Since motion processing (in V5) occurs roughly
100ms prior to color processing (in V4), micro-consciousnesses are distributed across time. If a
system has mechanisms which manage to detect things like motion, color, and shape, we have
conscious experience. Put another way, consciousness just is the right kind of (here visual)
detection. So, if the visual detection sites in the brain are firing, then we have microconsciousness (and if multiple sites are firing at once, we have multiple micro-consciousnesses
17

occurring all at once). More broadly, if the brain has any functioning perceptual detection
capacities, we have a kind of micro-consciousness going on--visual or other (Zeki 582-4).
Zeki thinks of macro-consciousness as a post-conscious binding of various micrconsciousnesses (583). In other words, macro-consciousness occurs when the brain takes
processed information from two or more sensory-specific areas and represents them as cooccurring at the same time. It’s post-conscious because by the time the brain gets to the
information, it’s already been processed by the sensory-specific sites. Here, the brain links up the
pre-processed (and therefore perceived) information from each site. Sometimes it does so
correctly (through binding) and at other times falsely (through mis-binding) where perceptions
which occur at different times are taken to happen all at once, so that the unified phenomena (of
color and motion, for example) seems to occur together (582-4).
While not all VS patients have the ability to visually detect objects, many do seem to
have functioning sensory-detection mechanisms. For Zeki, micro-consciousness is always a
form of brute object-consciousness. In contrast, macro-consciousness is a form of factconsciousness, though it doesn’t need to be accurate or reflective. Because this binding appears
to occur after the experience itself, it seems that we do not possess one unified, conscious
experience, but multiple consciousnesses which are judged to be unified only after the conscious
experience has been undergone. This unification only occurs after the conscious detection sites
have processed their information.
3.3.2 How to find it
Present imagery of a moving red ball to the patient’s eyes. If the relevant regions in the patient’s
sensory-cortices are activated, the patient has micro-consciousness. If the regions associated with
18

post-conscious binding are activated, then the patient also has macro-consciousness.
3.3.3 What this means and how it works
A patient who passes this test only needs to have motion-processing and color-processing
capacities activating at different times in different sensory-specific cortices. So long as our
clowns possess some kind of perceptual-detection capacities, we’ve got conscious clowns. So
long as our clowns possess some kind of perceptual-detection capacities, we have conscious
clowns. For Zeki then, all of our clowns are likely conscious. While all of our clowns most likely
have micro-consciousness, there might be some that have macro-consciousness as well.
We may even be able to make a plausible guess that Bozo and Chuckles possess a kind of
macro-consciousness in addition to their micro-consciousnesses. Because both the motor and
spatial regions are activated, the brain may be binding these processes together to create a unified
experience. Although Krusty does show interconnected activity in the thalamocortical system,
this activity and its location tells us little about the state of our patient’s consciousness. The
interconnectedness is irrelevant to Zeki’s conception of consciousness and the higher-order
thalamocortical system is not itself a region responsible for sense-detection. So, while we might
be capable of inferring that these unconscious connections resulted from a previously-conscious
perceptual state, the connections themselves tell us nothing about what triggered this or what is
being unified.
“Just hold on a minute,” Dr. Normal protests. “Consciousness must be more than detection!”
3.3.4 Some methodological setbacks
Dr. Normal expresses her confusion, explaining why it’s not clear that the disparate components
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of visual processing are themselves different loci of conscious perception. Likewise, the idea that
macro-consciousnesses’ unification of these space-and-time-separated sensory processes occurs
after the phenomenal experience is questionable. Although detection happens in each separable
visual process, this detection can occur even when the subject isn’t consciously aware of the
detection, suggesting that detection is not equivalent to perceptual experience. If these distinct
visual processes can occur and function without the input of the subject’s awareness, it seems
implausible that these disconnected, functioning processes are, on their own, kinds of perceptual
experience.
It seems then that macro-conscious connection is the place where conscious awareness
begins, since this is where active integration appears to occur. Many systems (like the brain)
have a multitude of processing mechanisms which function on their own as independent
processing sites, but few have the ability to unite the data from each of these processing sites into
one, integrated, phenomenal experience. While there is a time difference between the
occurrences of each visual process, there is not a time difference between conscious perceptual
experience—it is in this unity that consciousness is formed. It could be that one perceptual
mechanism is activated before the other, but the perception itself plausibly is able to unify the
two processes into one experience. Much like H20, where the compound cannot exist without the
necessary relation of each disparate part to the other, the occurrence of conscious perception
seems to rely not on the disparate functions of each individual process, but on the connections
forged between each of these visual processes.
Zeki wonders aloud. “Alright, what the heck do you suggest we do instead, Dr. Normal?!”
“Ahem,” Tononi and Koch jump in. “We might have a workable alternative.”
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4. IITC
4.1 What Consciousness Is
Tononi and Koch present IITC, which maintains that any non-zero amount of information
implies consciousness. According to IITC, there will be phenomenal-consciousness when there’s
a non-zero amount of integrated information. Since the information is being integrated, there will
also be some degree of access-consciousness—if the information is being integrated together
with their system’s executive centers, then it will also have access-consciousness. While Koch
and Tononi don’t address the other forms of consciousness, it’s reasonable to suppose that some
patterns of activation in the system will result in brute object awareness while other patterns of
activation will result in fact or reflective consciousness. According to Giulio Tononi and Cristof
Koch, consciousness is characterized by three qualities: it’s unified, it’s informative, and it’s
integrated (Tononi 287-9).
1) It’s unified: You cannot divide your conscious experience into parts while in the experience.
You may divide the experience through analysis after the fact, but this does not mean that the
experience while being experienced was divided. Similar situations can be found elsewhere. A
living organism functions as one, unified animal. This is not to say that after the fact it cannot be
dissected into its separate functional parts, but only that, while living, it is necessarily unified and
ceases to exist as a living thing once it has been carved and diced in one manner or another.
2) It’s informative: the conscious experience you have at a given moment of time (t) rules out
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countless other possible experiences you could be having in that exact moment. The experience
is specific to this (here and now) particular kind of experience.This system only exists in this
particular order in this particular moment for this particular kind of conscious perception and
which disappears once that forged and highly-specialized connection goes away again. This
shows us that it’s not just detection but a kind of highly complex, integrated system.
3) It’s integrated: the bigger the amount of integrated information, the more conscious a system
is. Integrated information is the stuff you get only when the (here neural) mechanisms within a
system share information with one another and the amount of information obtained from this
relation is greater than the amount of information which each individual component
(neuron/neural system) possesses on its own (Koch and Tononi 46).
On Tononi and Koch’s account, consciousness occurs not in the disparate activation of
dis-unified neurons and neural systems but in the particular kind of sharing of information
between these neural mechanisms and systems. The contents of this experience may vary in
complexity and volume, but at the very least, the contents, whatever they may be, will be unified,
integrated, and informative (46-7). If the system functions as one, unified system of indivisible
experience composed of integrated information, the entity is conscious. In other words, the more
the mechanisms within a system create information which exceeds the amount of information
each individual mechanism possesses on its own, the greater the degree of consciousness the
system possesses. Additionally, object-consciousness or fact-consciousness can be present in the
system—whether it has one or the other will depend on the complexity and specialization of the
system. The more complex the connections, the greater the amount of shared information, so the
more likely you have conscious experience. But, a system still has simpler object-consciousness
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so long as it has some kind of specialized, integrated connection within a system.
For IITC, then, even at the minimal stages of consciousness, phenomenal consciousness
can occur. When it comes to access-consciousness, it’s a little trickier. If we divide up accessconsciousness into 2 kinds--(1) detection, and (2) taking what’s been detected and broadcasting it
to the executive control center of the system (Block 272-4)--then, according to IITC, a system
that has access-consciousness (2) does have some kind of phenomenal experience. In other
words, if something is access-conscious (1), it’s not really conscious by IITC standards, since it’s
missing the crucial component of highly-specialized interconnectedness resulting in a kind of
informative perception rather than detection. However,so long as the patient possesses the
integrated, informative, and therefore unified neural system(s), then it has access-consciousness
(2)--the patient will have some kind of phenomenal, conscious experience.
4.2 How to find it
Stick a plastic-encased electromagnetic wire coil on the patient’s scalp. This will generate an
electric current under the skull. Use MRI and EEG scans to record the brain activity that follows
the stimulus. If the fMRI scan shows that the brain cells, fiber passageways, and synapticallylinked neurons are activated in different sensory and function-specific sites, we have
interconnected brain activity (Koch 24). If the EEG scan shows a high degree of electrical
activity (which approximates those of wakeful patients) then we have a high degree of
interaction (and therefore information sharing) going on between these interconnected sites (25).
“Fine, but how exactly does this make your theory any better than ours?” Owen and Zeki
demand.
“Let me try to translate,” Dr. Normal suggests.
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4.3 What this means and how it works
Dr. Normal begins. First, for IITC, lots of different regions must be activated for a system to be
conscious, so this activity is probably not simply a reflex. The higher the level of activation, the
less likely this brain activity is a reflexive response in the absence of consciousness. So, it gets
around the first issue Owen’s theory faces. Second, it avoids Owen’s second weakness because
you can have sufficient levels of integrated activation to achieve consciousness even if the
centers responsible for self-recognition and self-locating aren’t activated (or malfunction). Third,
IITC gets around Noh’s issue, since integrated activation can occur even if the patient doesn’t
manage to ‘misrepresent’ anything. And, fourth, based on IITC’s response to Zeki, IITC avoids
the weaknesses with Zeki’s test (by not calling unconscious detection mechanisms conscious).
Even if IITC isn’t perfect, it can at least do more than the other theories can.
Dr. Normal goes on. This would mean that for IITC, Krusty is clearly conscious.
Additionally, Wiggles is clearly unconscious. Bozo is likely conscious because he has to
integrate a lot of information to pass the Owen test (since he must activate a bunch of things to
construct the kind of awareness Owen demands). Remember that, for Owen’s test, you need to
have motor and spatial lobes all working together. There may not be as much integration going
on, but they’re still conscious (because he has a non-zero amount of integration going on in his
system. If we perform IITC test on Bozo and find that there’s some kind of observable, synaptic
connection going on between the function-specific regions (those responsible for spatial, motor,
and temperature-tactile awareness) and other brain regions interacting in this clown, we probably
have some degree of consciousness going on. If we discover that these function-specific regions
are connected to geographically-separated brain regions and have some level of complexity and
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some active interaction going on within these connected regions, we can infer that the patients
are at least minimally conscious. Likewise, Chuckles might be conscious, since the patient is
forced to make similar connections in his mis-representation (where our patient has the
experience of the lukewarm cube, the verbal cue about the cube, and the interpretation of the
experience, one which differs from the body’s actual contact with the cube).
As for Wiggles, Tononi and Koch both take seriously the possibility that small systems
and subsystems that have a nonzero amount of integrated information might possess their own
consciousness (like the visual system itself, the individual cells, etc.). So even if Wiggles isn’t
conscious, Wiggles’ subsystems might be. However, the conscious cells aren’t Abby Normal’s
patient—Wiggles is—so even if we have a bunch of conscious organisms living within Wiggles,
they aren’t Wiggles, so Wiggles isn’t conscious. Consequently, IITC suggests pulling the plug on
Wiggles.
Tononi and Koch grimly affirm Dr. Normal’s interpretation. “We’re afraid so.”
“No, you’re not getting away that easy,” mutter the theorists.
Koch and Tononi cast a look of confusion at the group. “Well, just what have we left out?”
4.4 Methodological Setbacks
4.4.1 Zeki’s rebuttal:
Zeki heads the assault. “Why assume that connectedness within neural systems is even
necessary (let alone sufficient) for consciousness? Sure, maybe my test’s criteria are too weak,
but what makes your test any stronger? Even if we assume that integrated brain activity is some
kind of active information integration, what about this integration tells us anything about its
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conscious state? Why should we think that data-swapping must be a conscious activity in all
cases of its occurrence? Look, it might be the case that a conscious person happens to have the
additional quality of integration of information going on, but why make the integration a
minimal requirement for the presence of conscious experience? I’m not denying that a subject
with integration going on is conscious, I’m just saying that the integration isn't the factor that
gives the subject its consciousness. Basically, it sure seems like integrated information is a
product of consciousness, not itself a conscious activity” (Zeki 584).6
Zeki goes on to attack Koch’s Neurobiological Framework for Consciousness. The
Neural Correlates of Consciousness (or NCC) project suggests that certain regions (like V1) are
ruled out as possible nodes of consciousness (Krich and Koch 569-70)-Zeki thinks this claim
seems unfounded. According to Zeki, not only is V1 a viable possibility, it is necessary for any
kind of conscious experience, and therefore cannot be ruled out (Zeki 582). Furthermore, why
not think that this integration (or “binding”) is itself a post-conscious phenomenon? What feature
of integration tells us that its conscious rather that post (or even un) conscious? (Zeki 584).
Here’s the issue: even if we assume that this activity is some kind of active information
integration, what about this integration tells us anything about its conscious state? Why should
we think that data-swapping must be a conscious activity in all cases of its occurrence? (reiterate binding issue). For the same reasons that Owen and Noh’s tests were rejected, IITC
should also be rejected.

6
Think back to Tim Bayne’s problem case of disconnected experience in cases of absence seizure with disunited
experience and behavioral output. Since there are cases where the subject is conscious even in a disunited,
experiential state, it seems that, not only is unity of information not necessary, but irrelevant to the presence of
consciousness.
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4.4.1.1 Tononi and Koch respond:
Before this connectivity occurs we’ve just got detection going on. Even within these connections
we’ve got a pretty minimal kind of consciousness going on. IITC asserts that once the axioms (or
essential properties of consciousness) are found, consciousness and the phenomenal experience
of the patient have been discovered. The process of integration works to connect otherwise
disparate bits of data by both differentiating the phenomenal experience from all other
experiences and at the same time unifying and connecting all sensory data together within the
phenomenal experience. The key to this integration is connectivity between mental elements
which depend causally on the interaction and unity with other elements within a given mental
system. As Tononi states,
The IITC also addresses, at least in principle, the second problem of consciousness,
which is not considered in other approaches. The IITC claims that, as the quantity of
consciousness depends on the amount of information that can be integrated within a
complex, the quality of consciousness (whether visual, auditory, colored, etc.) depends on
the informational relationships among its elements (Tononi 2004). More precisely, it is
specified by the matrix of effective information values among all of its subsets.
According to the IITC, the ”meaning” of each and every quale, such as “red” is provided
exclusively by the informational relationships among the elements of the complex
(Tononi 287-9).
So, the elements which unite to form your experience are indivisible—you cannot lobotomize the
experience you undergo while you sit within the experience. Without this unity, each disparate
part would act of its own accord as independent elements with no necessary causal connectivity
and therefore possess no degree of consciousness. Put simply, every conscious experience you
undergo is unavoidably unified and indivisible based on the causal dependence of the elements
whose combination comprises your conscious phenomenal experience (as H2o’s existence
depends not on disparate elements but on the unifying causal relation between the elements of
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Hydrogen and Oxygen).
4.4.2 Owen offers a counter-attack:
IITC talks about mechanisms and neural systems as being conscious, but this is a large leap to
make given the shortcomings of the empirical data—it might be more plausible to assert that
these mechanisms give rise to consciousness without themselves BEING conscious entities
(since each separate mechanism’s possession of consciousness might do away with the necessity
of integrated information)
4.4.2.1 Tononi taps out and Koch tags in:
Koch reminds Owen that IITC does not claim that the neurons or neural networks are themselves
conscious but does think that, with sufficient interconnectivity and complexity, the systems can
produce conscious experience. The IITC is concerned with discovering qualia (elements that
comprise consciousness) by explaining the contributions of Neural Correlates of Consciousness
(or NCC) to conscious perception (especially visual)—to discover which NCC’s produce each
particular aspect of consciousness. Again, we’re looking for the neural correlates of
consciousness, not conscious neurons. According to Crick and Koch, finding the neural
correlates means finding the producers of particular aspects of consciousness. The theoretical
framework of the information integration theory of consciousness (IITC) provides a tentative
solution to questions about the quality and quantity of consciousness produced by physical
systems (consciousness is affiliated with the brain’s capacity to integrate information)
While presence and amount of data and data-detection can be mimicked not just by
(apparently aware but unconscious) animals but inanimate objects as well (such as high-storage
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capacity computers), the connections made between these data points, when this connection is
present, requires more complex mental states.
4.4.3 Noh throws in his two cents:
Is causal connectivity synonymous with information integration? These interactions seem to
interact/are affiliated with one another but are not one and the same process. Correspondence
between information integration and the experience of consciousness does not appear to
guarantee that conscious experience just is (or is, even in part) information integration
4.4.3.1 Koch and Tononi respond:
Even if the connection itself were found to be caused by something/someone else, the mere
possession of these connections allows the patient to make free association between each part to
gain access to the capacities of recognition that separates conscious recognition from mere
command-based, disconnected detection. (So, we don’t just see that there is a plant in front of a
computer, we recognize what it means/that it doesn’t belong in relation to what usually sits in
front of a computer/how we feel/that it is we, the person in possession of this recognition that is
doing the thinking and feeling.)
As a puzzle’s completion gives you the finished picture, so a neuron on its own, like one
individual puzzle piece, does not embody the entire picture within its miniscule shape, but,
together with the remainder of its neural coalition, comprises (in some circumstances) an NCC).
In cases where they’re not connected (c/c one kind has been lost), this does not mean that each
can exist independent of the other, only that whatever was taken away was not essential for
consciousness (or) Zeki’s definition of consciousness is a bereft conception, one that does not
account for the complexity of even basic consciousness (detection of motion is not one and the
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same as recognition of motion/moving objects--one is automatic, unconscious, the other is a
conscious, aware process.
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5. CONCLUSION
After shooing the theorists out of her office, Dr. Normal begins to process the proposals. Owen’s
test gets it wrong sometimes, so we’d run the risk of lying to family and friends by calling
automatic, bodily reflex the product of a (now gone) conscious agent. Noh’s theory runs into the
same issue, just in a different section of the brain. Zeki’s test would certainly save us from
having to pull the plug on any of our clowns, but it’s not clear that disparate sensory-detection
sites make for conscious experience. Even though IITC isn’t perfect, it at least seems to
overcome the limitations of the other theories by identifying not just the activation site, but the
type, quality, presence, and cause of the trigger and how it relates to other neural systems which
might serve as motivation for the trigger (where the absence of connections indicates absence of
thoughtful motivation and action). So, Dr. Normal thinks that IITC does the best justice to the
unity that consciousness seems to have. She decides to pull the plug on Wiggles.
Does this mean that we should pull the plug on Wiggles and cases just like him? Should
we use resources to try to wake indeterminate cases like Bozo up? These are tricky questions
which I leave the reader to find the answer for themselves. I haven’t given definitive proof for
why IITC is the best theory out there—I’ve only tried to show that, of the three theories, IITC
seems to be the most effective test.
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Consciousness Chart
Name

Bozo

Brain Function
Theorist

activity in the spatial and motor cortices occurs after verbal command is uttered
Owen

Noh

Zeki

Tononi and Koch

Conscious or Unconscious? conscious likely (un)conscious
conscious (likely) conscious
Name

Chuckles

Brain Function

activity in Chuckles’ parietal lobe after verbal cue and physical stimulus

Theorist

Owen

Noh

Zeki

Tononi and Koch

Conscious or Unconscious? likely (un)conscious
conscious conscious likely conscious
Wiggles

Name
Brain Function

motion and color-processing activated at different times in different sensory-specific cortices

Theorist

Owen

Conscious or Unconscious?

Noh

Zeki

(likely) conscious

Tononi and Koch
unconscious
Krusty

Name
Brain Function
Theorist

high levels of activity/interaction between highly-specialized regions of thalamacortical system.

Owen

Noh

Zeki

Tononi and Koch

conscious
Conscious or Unconscious? conscious unconsciouslikely conscious
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